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THE

p AST

AND FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL

RULES IN STATE COURTS

Carl Tobias*
One decade and a half ago, Professor John B. Oakley published a pathbreaking, comprehensive assessment of the procedural systems prescribed by
all fifty of the states and the District of Columbia, in which the scholar compared those procedural schemes at the state level with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 1 This evaluation demonstrated that approximately two thirds
of the jurisdictions premised their procedural approaches substantially on the
federal model.2 However, the analysis also showed that a disproportionate
number of heavily-populated states employed procedures which departed from
their federal counterparts, so that essentially nonfederal regimes of procedure
governed sixty-two percent of the people in the United States. 3 Moreover,
Oakley's study ascertained that the "pace of state procedural reform to either
replicate or substantially emulate the federal model of procedure" had slackened nearly to a halt between 1975 and 1985 after a quarter century in which
there was an almost "constant rate of state-court replication of' the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 This assessment of the Federal Rules in state courts
proved to be especially valuable because a substantial number of proceduralists
have essentially devoted little attention to this important area of modem civil
process. 5
Professor Oakley's new reprise significantly advances comprehension of
the interaction between federal and state systems of civil procedure. Oakley
thoroughly documents the dwindling impact of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "as avatars of procedural reform" and finds "[f]ederal procedure is less
influential in state courts than at anytime in the past quarter-century." 6 The
author determines that many state procedural schemes fail to follow the federal

* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I
wish to thank Margaret Sanner for valuable suggestions, Genny Schloss for processing this
piece, and James E. Rogers for his generous, continuing support. I am a member of the Civil
Justice Reform Act Advisory Group of the United States District Court for the District of
Montana and of the Study Committee to Review the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, the views expressed in this piece and errors that remain are mine alone.
1
John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State
Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367 (1986).
2
See id. at 1377-78, 1431; see also John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in
State Courts, 3 Nev. L.J. 354 (2003).
3 See Oakley & Coon, supra note 1, at 1428-31; see also Oakley, supra note 2, at 358.
4 See Oakley, supra note 2, at 358; see also Oakley & Coon, supra note I, at 1434.
5 For a valuable, recent exception to this general proposition, see Seymour Moskowitz,
Rediscovering Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the Level Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS
L. REv. 595 (2002); see also Carl Tobias, A Civil Discovery Dilemma for the Arizona
Supreme Court, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 615 (2002).
6
See Oakley, supra note 2, at 355.
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system and arguably "there are no longer any true replicas of the FRCP to be
found among the procedural systems of the fifty states and the District of
Columbia." 7
Professor Oakley's substantial contribution to the Nevada Law Journal
dispute resolution symposium neither accords much treatment to how or why
the earlier uniformity between state and federal procedural regimes changed so
dramatically over such a brief period nor proffers very many suggestions for
the future. My response aspires primarily to scrutinize how federal-state consistency deteriorated and secondarily to consider what, if any, measures should
be instituted to change the present condition of state civil procedure in the fifty
jurisdictions comprising the United States.
I.

THE DECLINE

OF

FEDERAL-STATE PROCEDURAL UNIFORMITY

Professor Oakley candidly acknowledges that his contribution to the dispute resolution symposium does "not ... seek to investigate and evaluate the
causes for the decline of state conformity to the federal model .... " 8 However, the writer does "admit to a present belief that not all the 'newest' federal
rules are 'the best,' and from this perspective it seems ... more that the states
have elected to abstain from experimenting with dubious 'new ways' of adjudicating civil actions than that they have chosen 'to return to ... old ways' that
they had previously renounced." 9 Oakley elaborates on these propositions: "It
is the Federal Rules that appear to have moved away from the states, rather
than vice versa." 10
The author's ruminations in the paragraph immediately above capture a
number of comparatively important reasons for the decreasing consistency
between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the procedural systems that
numerous jurisdictions in the United States have implemented. Nonetheless,
Oakley's speculation warrants expansion, while important additional propositions apparently explain declining uniformity witnessed between the federal
and state procedural spheres.
One critical phenomenon has been the propensity of the federal rule revision entities to amend substantial numbers of federal rules, some of which revisions may lack effectiveness, with too great frequency. 11 The large package of
revisions that the Supreme Court promulgated in 1983 was symptomatic. 12
The set of amendments significantly changed numerous features of discovery
only three years after the 1980 "tinkering" revisions ceded considerably greater
7

See id.
See id. at 359.
9 See id.; see also Oakley & Coon, supra note 1, at 1427.
10
See Oakley, supra note 2, at 359.
11
Numerous observers, including Professor Oakley, have identified this phenomenon. See,
e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium,
59 BROOK. L. REv. 841, 846-47 (1993); John B. Oakley, An Open Letter on Reforming the
Process of Revising the Federal Rules, 55 MoNT. L. REv. 435 (1974).
12
See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461U.S.1095 (1983). See generally Arthur Miller, The August 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Promoting Effective Case Management and Lawyer Responsibility (Federal Judicial Center
1984).
8
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control over the pretrial process to federal district court judges through pretrial
conferences and scheduling orders and authorized district judges to sanction
lawyers who did not perform certain duties as officers of the court. 13 The
overuse, abuse, and satellite litigation, which numerous observers attributed to
the 1983 amendment of Federal Rule 11 governing sanctions, prompted the
United States Supreme Court's revision of that provision in 1993 as part of a
substantial group of amendments that additionally reformed discovery. 14 Perhaps most controversial was an alteration in Rule 26 to impose mandatory
prediscovery, or automatic, disclosure. 15 This requirement concomitantly
authorized all ninety-four federal district courts to reject or modify the federal
rule 16 partly as an accommodation of ongoing experimentation with disclosure,
discovery, and numerous other cost and delay reduction procedures under the
Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990. 17 Disclosure's highly controversial
nature and the complication and confusion generated by nationwide experimentation with diverse expense and delay reduction measures, a significant number
of which conflicted with applicable federal rules and legislation, prompted the
rule revision entities to amend the provisions covering discovery once again in
2000. 18 The most important of these recent modifications limited the scope of
discovery as a general matter and the scope of automatic disclosure specifically, adopted a national disclosure rule and correspondingly prohibited local
federal district court departures from that proviso, and imposed limitations on
the number and length of depositions. 19
In short, over the last two decades, the number of federal rule amendments
has significantly increased, while the frequency of federal rule revision has
accelerated. Each of the federal district courts has also prescribed and applied
escalating numbers of local requirements, some of which strictures conflict
with analogous federal rules and statutes. 20 Indeed, the 1990 Civil Justice
13
See sources cited supra note 12; see also Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995, 998-1000 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (affording and criticizing the
"tinkering" 1980 federal rules amendments).
14
See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993) [hereinafter
1993 Amendments]; see also Carl Tobias, Improving the 1998 and I990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1589, 1606-16 (1994). See generally Georgene M. Vairo,
Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 475 (1991).
15
See 1993 Amendments, supra note 14, at 420-21. See generally Griffin B. Bell, Chilton
Davis Varner, & Hugh Q. Gottschalk, Automatic Disclosure in Discovery - The Rush to
Reform, 27 GA. L. REv. 1 (1993); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory
Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795 (1991).
16
See 1993 Amendments, supra note 14, at 421; see also Bell et al., supra note 15, at 3539.
17
See Paul D. Carrington, Learning From the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real
Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295 (1994); A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the
Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1582-83 (1991).
18
See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted in 192 F.R.D. 340
(2000) [hereinafter 2000 Amendments]. See generally Carl Tobias, A Modest Reform for
Federal Procedural Rulemaking, 64 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs 283 (Spring/Summer 2001).
19
See 2000 Amendments, supra note 18. See generally Carl Tobias, The 2000 Federal
Civil Rules Revisions, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 875 (2001).
20 See, e.g., Walter W. Heiser, A Critical Review of the Local Rules of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 557-64
(1996); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules. Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Diver-
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Reform Act seemingly authorized, and may well have encouraged, all ninetyfour federal district courts to promulgate and to enforce additional local measures, growing numbers of which conflicted with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and federal legislation. 21
These federal developments, particularly the large number and heightened
pace of amendments, may have contributed to federal-state inconsistency. The
developments discouraged states from including in their rules of civil procedure
new federal revisions, some of which the jurisdictions might have found
offered questionable efficacy. For example, numerous states which had
amended their sanctioning provisions to include the 1983 revision in Federal
Rule 11 did not adopt the 1993 amendment in Federal Rule 11. 22 Moreover,
the highly controversial nature of the 1993 revision in Federal Rule 26 to
impose automatic disclosure apparently dissuaded many jurisdictions from
instituting that change, while a number of states seemed to adopt a "wait and
see" attitude, pending additional experimentation with the device in the federal
system. 23 These approaches undertaken by the states were apparently vindicated, because the Supreme Court further amended Rule 26 to limit disclosure
and proscribe local district court departures from the federal stricture during
2000, a date which was relatively soon after the controversial 1993 revision. 24
Professor Oakley concludes that "where once the ideal 'one procedure for
state and federal courts' was a beacon for procedural reform, its light has
dimmed to barely a flicker," even as he recognizes that "federal influence on
state procedure remains substantial, and important." 25 Indeed, one of the consummate ironies is how numerous jurisdictions have replicated dynamics witnessed at the federal level in several critical ways. First, under state
equivalents of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83, districts and trial judges in
numerous jurisdictions have adopted local measures that conflict with state
rules of civil procedure. 26 For example, the governing strictures, dockets' size
and complexity, and local legal cultures differ substantially between districts in
less densely populated counties and Clark County, Nevada (which includes Las
Vegas), but even between that particular subdivision and Washoe County,
Nevada (which includes Reno). 27 Second, in many jurisdictions, state legislagence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2016-20 (1989). See
generally Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century, 77
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 533 (2002).
21
See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,
46 STAN. L. REv. 1447 (1994); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Sunset, 1998 U. ILL L.
REv. 547.
22 See, e.g., MoNT. R. Crv. P. 11; NEV. R. Crv. P. 11.
23 See Oakley, supra note 2, APPENDIX TABLE 2, at 386. See generally Mullenix, supra
note 15.
24
See supra notes 15, 18, 19, and accompanying text.
25 See Oakley, supra note 2, at 383-84.
26
See, e.g., Az. R. Crv. P. 83; MoNT. R. Crv. P. 83; NEv. R. C1v. P. 83. See generally
Tobias, supra note 5. The districts located in the metropolitan subdivisions, but also in Jess
populated areas, of these three states have adopted numerous local procedures, some of
which conflict with or repeat state rules of civil procedure.
27 The caseload per judge, the governing local procedures, and the pace of civil litigation
differ significantly in Clark and Washoe Counties. See Annual Report of the Nevada Judiciary, Fiscal Year 2000-01 (Supreme Court of Nev. 2001) (on file with author).
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tion in substantive areas of law, such as medical malpractice and product liability, and in the field of civil justice reform, prescribes measures that conflict
with state rules of civil procedure. 28 For instance, the medical malpractice
reform statute recently passed by the Nevada Legislature includes a sanctioning
provision which deviates from the analogous state rule of civil procedure 11. 29
II.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The lofty ideal of "one procedure for state and federal courts" may always
have been basically that: an admirable, but essentially unattainable, goal.
Moreover, it is difficult to be particularly sanguine about the prospects for remedying federal-state disuniformity, although certain of inconsistency's most
detrimental features may be amenable to amelioration.
The federal rule revisors have instituted one important effort to improve
the increasing disuniformity that plagues the national system. The 2000
amendments retracted authority for federal district court adoption of local measures that depart from the federal rules. 30 This is a helpful initial step, although
considerably more remains to be achieved before inconsistency in the federal
system will be reduced, much less eliminated. For example, the Judicial Conference, the Circuit Judicial Councils, and the district courts should implement
their duties - imposed under the 1988 Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act and various federal rules - to review local measures and abolish or
modify those deemed to be in conflict with federal rules or statutes. 31 The
1990 Civil Justice Reform Act essentially discontinued effectuation of these
obligations. 32 However, the expiration of that statute in 2000 means the entities should promptly implement the rule review responsibilities. 33 Until the
national system reattains much greater uniformity, state civil procedure will
probably not become more consistent with the federal regime, and its condition
may even deteriorate.
Should the federal scheme achieve increased uniformity, this development
might encourage state attempts to enhance consistency. Nonetheless, several
obstacles could impede efforts to increase uniformity in the fifty jurisdictions.
Numerous states may not possess sufficient resources to decrease inconsistency, but more jurisdictions might lack the requisite will, in part because there
apparently is no strong constituency which supports this reform. Substantial
incentives for maintaining the status quo or departing even further from uniformity also exist. Experience in the federal arena clearly suggests that judges,
28

The idea about civil justice reform should not be surprising because the federal reform
was premised substantially on state reforms. See Tobias, supra note 21, at 564.
29
Compare A.B. I § 16 (2002) with NEv. R. Civ. P. 11. See generally Carl Tobias, Procedural Provisions in Nevada Medical Malpractice Reform, 3 Nev. L.J. 406 (2003).
30 See 2000 Amendments, supra note 18, at 384-85, 391.
31 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332 (d)(4), 2071 (a) (1994); FED R. APP. P. 47; FED R. BANKR. P. 9029;
FED R. C1v. P. 83; FED. R. CRIM. P. 57. See generally Tobias, supra note 20.
32 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-78; see also Tobias, supra note 14, at 1605. See generally Robel,
supra note 21.
33 See Pub. L. No. 106-518, § 206, 114 Stat. 2411, 2414 (2000). See generally Carl Tobias,
The Expiration of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 541
(2002).

Winter 2002/2003]

PAST AND FUTURE OF FEDERAL RULES

405

attorneys, and parties favor local procedure with which they are familiar and
that often affords local interests strategic and additional benefits. 34
Despite these hurdles, jurisdictions should carefully evaluate whether
mounting disuniformity is advisable. For instance, the growing inconsistency
may increase the expense of civil litigation. If states ascertain that greater uniformity is warranted, the jurisdictions should review state civil procedures for
consistency with the federal rules and adopt the federal analogues that have
proven effective. States might correspondingly implement local procedural
review which resembles that in the federal system.
III.

CONCLUSION

Professor John Oakley's contribution to the dispute resolution symposium
significantly improves comprehension of the relationship between contemporary federal and state regimes of civil procedure. The author demonstrates that
most jurisdictions have deviated from the federal system over the last decade
and a half. My response attempts to elucidate why this departure has occurred
and how states might rectify or ameliorate the circumstances.

34
See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992); Robel, supra note 21.

